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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans value education. We regard it as essential for
success in our society. The stability of our political institutions
depends on citizens who are educated so that they may exercise
their rights effectively.1 In recognition of this, every state in the
Union operates a public school system. Although the Supreme
Court has not held that education is a fundamental right, the
Court has said that if a state assumes the responsibility for edu-
cating some children, then it must make the opportunity of edu-
cation available to all.2 Until recently, however, handicapped
children were completely excluded from our schools.
Prior to 1975, educational opportunities for handicapped
children were haphazard, and, more often, nonexistent.' Con-
gress tried to assist the States," but these efforts proved unsatis-
factory.5 To help the States respond more effectively,O Congress
1. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1972).
2. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
3. Congress found that although nearly all States had laws mandating public educa-
tion for all handicapped children, there had been little or no enforcement of the man-
dates. H. R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975).
4. The Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
750, 80 Stat. 1191 (1966) amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) by adding a new Title VI. The Education of
the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970), codified at 20 U.S.C. §
1401, replaced Title VI, and superseded Title III of the Mental Retardation Facilities
Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (1963), the Grants for Teaching in the
Education of Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 85-926, 72 Stat. 1777 (1958), and
the Instructional Media for Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 85-905, 72 Stat. 1742
(1958). The Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972), the
Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484 (1974), and the Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, amended the Education of the Handi-
capped Act.
5. In 1975, out of more than 8 million handicapped children, 3.9 million were receiv-
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passed the Education For All Handicapped Children Act of
19757 (EHA) to assure that every handicapped childs received a
"free appropriate public education."' What exactly Congress
meant by this phrase10 has generated considerable debate.
Congress clearly stated, however, that a child's Individual-
ized Education Program11 (IEP) was the cornerstone I of a free
ing an appropriate education, 2.5 million were receiving an inappropriate education, and
1.75 million were receiving no educational services at all. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1432.
6. Congress found that although court decisions were establishing the right of all
handicapped children in the United States to a free appropriate public education, state
financial resources were frequently inadequate to the task of providing an education for
all handicapped children. H. R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975), S. REP. No.
168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 1425,
1431-32. The Senate Committee reporting the EHA explicitly stated that "[i]t is the
intent of the Committee to establish and protect the right to education for all handi-
capped children and to provide assistance to the States in carrying out their responsibili-
ties under State law and the Constitution of the United States to provide equal protec-
tion of the laws." S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1437.
7. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232, 1401, 1405, 1406,
1411-20, 1453 (1976 & Supp. Ill 1979)).
8. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(1) (1976) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(a) (1981) define handicapped
children as children who are mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired,
visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, deaf-
blind, multi-handicapped and those who have specific learning disabilities and need spe-
cial education and related services.
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976).
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.4 (1982) define free appropriate
public education as special education and related services that (a) have been provided at
public expense, without charge and under public supervision; (b) meet the standards of
the state educational agency; and (c) provide an individualized education program for
each child at the preschool, elementary, or secondary school level. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16)
(1976) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.14 (1982) define special education as specially designed
instruction to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, including classroom
instruction, physical education, and instruction in homes, hospitals, and institutions if
necessary. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1982) define related ser-
vices as transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and support services as a
handicapped child requires to benefit from special education. These services are to
include early identification and assessment of handicapping conditions, medical services
necessary for diagnosis and evaluation, speech pathology, audiology, psychological coun-
seling, physical therapy, occupational therapy, and recreation.
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976) and 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.340-.349 (1982) define an indi-
vidualized education program as follows: [a]n IEP is a written statement for each handi-
capped child prescribing specialized instruction to meet his or her unique needs. The
IEP is developed in meetings which are to include the handicapped child if appropriate,
the child's parents or guardian, the child's teacher, and a representative of the school
district qualified to provide or supervise the program of instruction for the child. The
IEP must include (1) a statement of the child's current educational performance, (2) a
statement of short-term instruction objectives and annual goals, (3) a statement of spe-
cific educational services to be provided to the child and the extent to which the child
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appropriate public education. The EHA mandated active paren-
tal involvement with the child's teacher and school district in
developing a comprehensive written plan of educational goals,
services, and regular evaluation for each child. The ongoing IEP
process was designed to manifest what Congress regarded as a
fundamental tenet: "[e]ach child requires an educational plan
that is tailored to achieve his or her maximum potential."1 s
Unfortunately, other Congressional statements conflicted with
such ambitious pronouncements and Congress failed to specify
the exact standard of education that States were expected to
provide. States such as Washington developed their own educa-
tional standard1 4 which substantially avoided the rigors of the
IEP process.
The EHA legislative history indicates that Congress
intended a standard of education which would give handicapped
children an educational opportunity equal to that provided non-
handicapped children.1 5 Lower federal courts interpreting the
EHA developed three different standards, each building on the
goal of equal educational opportunity,'" but no definitive stan-
will be able to participate in regular school programs, (4) a statement of dates for initia-
tion and duration of the services, and (5) an evaluation by objective criteria at least
yearly to determine whether instruction goals are being met and such evaluation is to
include the child's parent or guardian.
12. See H. R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
& AD. NEWS, 1425, 1437-38, S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-12, reprinted in
1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1434-36.
13. H. R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1975).
14. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 59-60, 81-92 and accompanying text.
16. A free appropriate public education has been defined by one of three standards:
(1) The maximum potential standard: An appropriate education is one which enables the
handicapped child to achieve his or her full potential; (2) The commensurate opportu-
nity standard: An appropriate education requires that each handicapped child be given
an opportunity to achieve his or her full potential commensurate with the opportunity
provided other children; (3) The self-sufficiency standard: An appropriate education is
one that enables each handicapped child to be as free as reasonably possible from depen-
dency on others, and enables him or her to be a productive member of society. All of the
federal courts of appeal which considered the question and a majority of federal district
courts which considered the question either adopted, or cited with approval, the com-
mensurate opportunity standard. See Springdale School Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 656 F.2d
300, 305 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3505 (1982); Battle
v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 277 (3rd Cir. 1980); Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. School
Dist. 520 F. Supp. 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905, 912-13
(S.D. Tex. 1981); Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107, 113 (W.D. Va. 1981); Bales v.
Clarke, 523 F. Supp. 1366, 1370 (E.D. Va. 1981); Hines v. Pitts County Bd. of Educ., 497
F. Supp. 403, 406 (E.D. N.C. 1980). Two district courts adopted or referred to the maxi-
mum potential standard. See Age v. Bullitt County Pub. Schools, No. (78-0461-L(B)), 3
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dard has emerged. In its first decision addressing the issue,
Board of Education v. Rowley17 ("Rowley"), the Supreme Court
struck down an equal educational opportunity standard devel-
oped by the two lower federal courts;18 this standard had struck
a balance between providing no education at all and the unreal-
istic goal of maximizing the potential of each child. The Rowley
Court instead adopted a standard based on educational bene-
fit."9 The minimal requirements of the educational benefit stan-
dard severely restrict the effectiveness of the EHA. Under this
nebulous standard, nearly any state program for a given handi-
capped child will suffice; consequently, handicapped children
will be denied the education Congress intended for them under
the EHA. As if this were not enough, however, the Rowley Court
destroyed a major component of the procedural safeguards in
the EHA by which parents could demand an equal educational
opportunity for their child.
In order to qualify for EHA funds,20 the States must pro-
vide administrative review procedures so that a child's parents
E.H.L.R. 551:505 (1980), a/I'd, 673 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1981); DeWalt v. Burkholder, No.
80-0014-A, 3 E.H.L.R. 551:550, 553 (E.D. Va. 1980). A number of courts have referred to
self-sufficiency, but no court has advocated this as a general standard, see, e.g., Arm-
strong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981).
17. 458 U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
18. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), Pennsylvania Ass'n of
Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F.Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also infra
note 46 and accompanying text. A discussion of the various theories put forth to provide
meaning to a standard of equal educational opportunity for handicapped children is
beyond the scope of this article. For a thorough discussion see Haggerty & Sacks, Educa-
tion of the Handicapped: Towards a Definition of an Appropriate Education, 50 TEMP.
L.Q. 961, 964-84 (1977). 1
19. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
20. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412, 1413 (1976) and 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.110-.151 (1982) describe the
requirements state plans must meet. Section 1412(1) requires the state to have in effect a
policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public educa-
tion. Section 1412(1)(A) requires the state to establish (1) a goal of providing full educa-
tional opportunity to all handicapped children, (2) a detailed timetable for accomplish-
ing such a goal, and (3) a description of facilities, personnel, and services necessary
throughout the state to meet such a goal. Section 1413(a)(4)(B) requires the state to
provide a free appropriate public education to children in private schools and facilities.
Section 1413(9)(B) provides that EHA funds are to supplement and increase state and
local funds expended for education of handicapped children and not to replace such
state funds. This last provision is a manifestation of Congress's desire that the EHA be a
means for helping the states to meet their own obligations under the Constitution to
provide equal protection for handicapped children (emphasis added). See S. REP. No.
168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1975, U.S. CoDE CONG. & An. NEws 1425,
1437.
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can challenge the IEP.2 1 A parent dissatisfied with the school
district's decision regarding the child's educational program can
appeal administratively. Under the EHA, if still dissatisfied, a
parent could bring a de novo action in state or federal court
seeking appropriate relief.22 In Washington, however, the state
review officer for the Superintendent of Public Instruction in
four administrative decisions23 developed a set of presumptions2 4
that effectively exclude many administrative appeals by parents.
The Rowley Court had the opportunity to reverse such state
erosions of the EHA. Unfortunately, the Court ratified and
encouraged such attacks. The Court's educational benefit stan-
dard" demands as little as Washington's "suitable education"
standard.26 The Rowley Court suggested a way to sidestep the
IEP process2 7 which is similar to Washington's avoidance
method." Finally, the Court eliminated judicial review of state
administrative decisions regarding educational standards and
the educational programs of handicapped children.2 9 The Rowl-
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976) and 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.500-.589 require a state receiving
EHA funds to set up an elaborate administrative appeals procedure that protects the
due process rights of handicapped children and their parents. The school must notify
parents of actions to be taken with regard to their child. If parents want to contest the
IEP for their child, they are entitled to file a complaint and receive an impartial hearing.
Parents have the right to examine school records. Parents may request an independent
evaluation of their child that parents do not pay for unless the school district prevails at
the hearing. Parents may be represented by counsel at the hearing. The parents and
school district have the right to present evidence, present their own experts or witnesses,
and to confront, cross-examine and compel attendance of witnesses at the hearing. There
must be a verbatim record of the hearing. An independent review officer, provided at
school district expense but not a school district employee, must render a decision with
specific findings and conclusions. If either party is dissatisfied with the hearing decision,
they may appeal to the state educational agency which is to make an independent
review. If either party is dissatisfied with this decision they may bring an action de novo
in state or federal court.
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976).
23. In re Marty S., Special Educ. Cause No. 78-1 (Superintendent of Pub. Instruc.,
Wash., Oct., 1978); In re Jean Marie and Michelle Lyn H., Special Educ. Cause No. 79-
2A and 79-2B (Superintendent of Pub. Instruc., Wash., Aug., 1979); In re John Mc.,
Special Educ. Cause No. 79-7 (Superintendent of Pub. Instruc., Wash., Mar., 1980); In re
Vickie M., Special Educ. Cause No. 80-4 (Superintendent of Pub. Instruc., Wash., Nov.,
1980).
24. These presumptions have been designated by the author as the Marty S. pre-
sumption, the dominant view presumption, and the Vickie M. presumption. See infra
notes 141-42, 153-56, 162-63 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
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ey Court justified this elimination by claiming that parental
ardor and participation in the IEP process were sufficient
remaining safeguards for handicapped children.30 However,
effective exclusion of many appeals at the local hearing level,
because of administrative presumptions marshalled against par-
ents, render those safeguards meaningless.3 ' This Comment
asserts that state attacks on the EHA, combined with the Rowl-
ey Court's adoption of a minimal educational benefit standard
and elimination of judicial review, have eviscerated the EHA
which can only be resurrected by Congressional intervention.
II. THE Rowley DECISION
Amy Rowley was a highly motivated, intelligent, eight year
old deaf girl.3 ' The district drafted Amy's IEP, as the EHA
requires,38 in the fall of her first grade.3 4 Her parents partici-
pated but were not satisfied with the results. The district's Com-
mittee on the Handicapped"8 (COH) began Amy's IEP process
by developing a recommendation for Amy's school. Although
Amy's parents had presented expert testimony s that Amy
needed a sign language interpreter," the COH's recommenda-
tion did not include an interpreter.3 3 The COH did, however,
recommend that Amy's IEP include a hearing aid, a tutor and a
speech therapist.3 9 Using this recommendation, Amy's teacher
30. See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 141-42, 153-56, 162-63 and accompanying text.
32. See 632 F.2d at 947.
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1976).
34. 483 F. Supp. at 530.
35. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4402(1) (b) (1) (McKinney 1981) authorizes a Committee on
the Handicapped to assist the school district in determining the proper educational pro-
gram. Amy's COH included a psychologist, educator, physician, and one of her parents.
New York's Committee on the Handicapped is to be distinguished from those individu-
als the EHA requires as participants in developing the IEP. 34 C.F.R. § 300.344 requires
the following participants: (1) a representative of the school district other than the
child's teacher, (2) the child's teacher, (3) one or both of the parents, (4) the child when
appropriate, and (5) other individuals at the discretion of the parent or school district.
36. 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(c) (1981) requires the school district to consider results of
independent evaluations of the child obtained by the parents.
37. 483 F. Supp. at 530-31. All participants in Amy's IEP agreed she would be main-
streamed (see infra note 65) for academic classes with nonhandicapped children. Her
parents believed that Amy required a sign language interpreter in her academic classes
for her to receive a free appropriate public education. Id.




drafted the IEP.'0 Her parents assented to the IEP except for
the failure to provide for a sign language interpreter. The IEP
was returned to the COH for review, which affirmed its first rec-
ommendation." The Rowleys demanded a hearing before an
independent hearing officer who ruled against them,4" as did the
New York Commissioner of Education on appeal.4 s
The Rowleys then filed suit in federal district court44 charg-
ing that Amy was not receiving a free appropriate public educa-
tion. The District Court and Court of Appeals4' agreed with the
Rowleys. The standard of education required under the EHA,
both courts stated, is one that gives "each handicapped child
. . . an opportunity to achieve his full potential commensurate
with the opportunity provided to other (nonhandicapped) chil-
dren."'46 Applying this standard, the courts held that providing
Amy with a free appropriate public education required a sign
language interpreter for her academic classes.'
The school district's appeal to the United States Supreme
Court presented the Court with its first opportunity to interpret
the EHA. The Court held that a state satisfies the requirement
of a free appropriate public education for a handicapped child if
it "provide[s] personalized instruction with sufficient support
services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that
instruction' 48 (emphasis added). Writing for the majority,9 Jus-





44. Rowley v. Board of Education, 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. N.Y. 1980).
45. Rowley v. Board of Education, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980).
46. 483 F. Supp. at 534. The statement of U. S. District Court Judge Broderick
invites the following analysis: Compare any handicapped child with a nonhandicapped
child of the same age. Every child has a maximum potential level and a performance
level. Every child experiences a gap between his performance and his potential. This is to
be expected, because no school maximizes every child's potential. But a handicapped
child experiences an additional shortfall in performance by virtue of his or her handicap.
It is this shortfall, the statement suggests, that every school district is obligated to elimi-
nate and only then will a handicapped child have an educational opportunity equal to a
nonhandicapped child. See Stark, Tragic Choices in Special Education: The Effect of
Scarce Resources on the Implementation of P.L. 94-142, 14 CONN. L. REv. 477, 500
(1982).
47. 632 F.2d, at 948; 483 F. Supp. at 535.
48. 458 U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 3049.
49. Rowley was a 6-3 decision. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stevens and O'Connor joined. Justice
Blackmun concurred in the judgment. Justices White, Brennan and Marshall dissented.
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below. 50 The Court supported its holding by finding that the leg-
islative history of the EHA "do[es] not imply a congressional
intent to achieve strict equality of opportunity" 51 for handi-
capped children. The Court found that Congress, by enacting
the EHA, sought primarily to provide access to education for
handicapped children as opposed to an equal educational oppor-
tunity. Therefore, the Court reasoned, Congress imposed no
greater educational standard upon the states than would make
such access meaningful.
52
Justice Rehnquist claimed support for this proposition from
three sources: (1) principles established in the two major federal
handicapped education rights cases, Mills v. Board of Educa-
tion"5 and Pennsylvania Association of Retarded Children v.
Commonwealth5 4 (P.A.R.C.), both discussed in the Congres-
sional committee reports;5  (2) statements in the legislative his-
tory by senators and congressmen;5 6 and (3) statements and
tables in the committee reports describing the scope of the prob-
lem for handicapped children in 1975. 57 These sources, however,
do not adequately explain the Court's rejection of the equal edu-
cational opportunity standard. Arguably, each source supports
the conclusion the Court rejected.
The Mills and P.A.R.C. cases were explicitly referred to in
the Senate and House committee reports on the EHA. The
reports also make reference to Brown v. Board of Education."
Together, these cases propound the principle of equal educa-
tional opportunity for handicapped children. The Senate Labor
50. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
51. 458 U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 3047.
52. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 3048.
53. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). Mills was a class action on behalf of handi-
capped children in the District of Columbia against the District's Board of Education for
failure to provide plaintiffs with a publicly supported education and for exclusion or
transfer of plaintiffs from public schools without due process of law. The court held that
plaintiffs were constitutionally entitled to a publicly supported education and to a hear-
ing before exclusion, suspension, or transfer from public school. Id. at 878.
54. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). P.A.R.C. was a class action brought by the
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children and thirteen parents on behalf of all
mentally handicapped children excluded from an education by the Commonwealth. The
parties reached a consent agreement whereby no mentally retarded child could be
excluded from public education without a prior hearing. Id. at 314.
55. Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. -, n.16, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3044, n.16
(1982).
56. 458 U.S. at _, n.13, 102 S. Ct. at 3043, n.13.
57. 458 U.S. at _, nn.19-20, 102 S. Ct. at 3045-46 nn.19-20.
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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and Public Welfare Committee (the Senate Committee), review-
ing federal cases that led to the EHA, stated that in Brown the
Supreme Court established the principle of educational opportu-
nity.5 9 The Senate Committee reiterated the familiar quote from
Brown:
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity ... is a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms.60
The Senate Committee viewed P.A.R.C and Mills as "guaran-
tee[ing] the right to free publicly-supported education for handi-
capped children .. ."61 The House Education and Labor Com-
mittee called P.A.R.C. the first case in a nationwide movement
in state and federal courts granting handicapped children a con-
stitutional right to a public education.2
Not surprisingly, the Rowley Court correctly perceived that
the principle of access to education for handicapped children
was one aspect of P.A.R.C. and Mills. When P.A.R.C. and Mills
were decided, 80,000 of Pennsylvania's 126,000 handicapped
children" and 12,340 of the District of Columbia's 16,620 handi-
capped children" ' received no public education at all. Getting in
the schoolhouse door was a necessary first step in both cases.
But P.A.R.C. and Mills went beyond the principle of access.
Both courts believed it was not sufficient to merely get handi-
capped children in the school and segregate them from non-
handicapped children; the school must strive to mainstream6 5
59. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in, 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1430.
60. 347 U.S. at 493, quoted in 348 F. Supp. at 875.
61. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1425, 1430.
62. H. R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975).
63. 343 F. Supp. at 296.
64. 348 F. Supp. at 868-69.
65. The EHA places a high priority on educating handicapped children with non-
handicapped children in a regular classroom. This practice is known as mainstreaming.
The EHA requires education of a handicapped child in a separate classroom only when
the child's education in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and services is not
satisfactory. See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1432; H. RaP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975); and 20
U.S.C. § 1412(5)(b) (1976). For a critical examination of mainstreaming provisions of the
EHA see Miller & Miller, The Handicapped Child's Civil Right as it Relates to the
"Least Restrictive Environment" and Appropriate Mainstreaming, 54 IND. L.J. 1
(1978).
1983]
192 University of Puget Sound Law Review
these children by educating them alongside nonhandicapped
children in a regular classroom."' Mills affirmed each child's
right to receive a free and independent medical, psychological,
and educational evaluation and to be placed in a publicly sup-
ported educational program suited to his or her needs."' Further,
the Mills Court announced that the state may be required to
provide its handicapped children with a compensatory education
that overcomes the present effects of prior educational depriva-
tions." P.A.R.C. stood for the principle that each handicapped
child should receive an annual written statement of educational
strategy and an annual evaluation of that strategy," and that
review of a handicapped child's educational program must
include notice to the parents, an opportunity for them to be
heard, 0 and other procedural safeguards.71 P.A.R.C. and Mills
established principles that took handicapped children far
beyond mere access to the schoolhouse and demanded far more
of schools than simply opening the door to handicapped
children.
The Mills Court viewed its decision as one furthering the
principle of equal educational opportunity. Mills relied for
authority not only on Brown, but on Hobsen v. Hansen,7 in
which the D. C. district court found that denying poor public
school children an educational opportunity equal to that availa-
ble to more affluent public school children violated the due pro-
cess clause. Mills held that denying handicapped children "not
just an equal publicly supported education but all publicly sup-
ported education, while providing such education to other chil-
dren, violates the due process clause."
The Rowley Court, by taking three circuitous steps, ignored
the equal educational opportunity principle in Mills. The Court
correctly perceived that the Mills Court did not require a sub-
stantive educational standard. The Court then stated that Mills
66. 343 F. Supp. at 307; 348 F. Supp. at 880.
67. 348 F. Supp. at 879, 880-81.
68. Id. at 879.
69. 343 F. Supp. at 313.
70. Id. at 314.
71. Id. at 304. Such notice must include a detailed description of any proposed
change in the child's program, must advise the parent of alternative educational oppor-
tunities for his child besides the proposed one, and must inform the parents of their
right to a full hearing before the state's Secretary of Education or his designee.
72. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
73. 348 F. Supp. at 875.
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no doubt contained principles that Congress incorporated into
the EHA. The Court selected access from the numerous princi-
ples at work in Mills and superimposed only the access principle
on the EHA. Analysis shows, however, that the Mills Court
applied the principle of equal educational opportunity to handi-
capped children just as the Hobsen Court had applied it to poor
children. Congressional records support the conclusion that Con-
gress incorporated principles from P.A.R.C. and Mills into the
EHA. Viewed in toto, they do not suggest that Congress bor-
rowed only the principle of access from those cases, but in fact
suggest that Congress also embraced the principle of equal edu-
cational opportunity.
The Rowley majority suggested that Congress may have
referred to cases other than Mills and P.A.R.C. for guiding prin-
ciples in passing the EHA. 7" The cases suggested by the Court,
however, were inappropriate. For example, the Court stated that
Congress may have looked to San Antonio v. Rodriguez7 5
decided one year after Mills. Rodriguez held that the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment did not require
states to expend equal financial resources on the education of
each child.7 e Rodriguez supported the Mills holding that handi-
capped children cannot, when a school district has limited
funds, be forced to bear a heavier burden than nonhandicapped
children.7 But Rodriguez did not repudiate the principle of
equal educational opportunity in Mills. Moreover, Rodriguez is
simply irrelevant to the issue of Congressional intent behind the
EHA.7 s Congress nowhere in the legislative history refers to
Rodriguez as a limiting factor on EHA provisions.7
74. 458 U.S. -, -, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3047 (1982).
75. 411 U.S. 1 (1975).
76. Id. at 23-24.
77. 348 F. Supp. at 876.
78. The constitutionality of a Texas statutory funding scheme was at issue in Rodri-
guez. 411 U.S. at 17. The constitutionality of the EHA was not at issue in Rowley. Rodri-
guez reviewed a state mechanism for division of limited state education funds. Id. at 9-
11. By contrast, Congress intended under the EHA to increase its funding of handi-
capped education in the future, and it expected the states to increase their funding as
well. See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1425, 1438-39. Under the EHA, Congress nowhere expressed the fear that
the combination of federal and state expenditures for handicapped children would place
them above or below the per pupil expenditures for nonhandicapped children. Rodriguez
was amenable to analysis under the equal protection clause, but this analysis was inap-
propriate for analyzing the EHA, passed under the spending power of Congress.
79. See, e.g., S. RFP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1430-31 and H. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, 10
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A second source for the Rowley majority's proposition that
Congress intended only access to education for handicapped
children were statements by Senators Cranston and Javits and
Congresswoman Mink.80 However, analysis of other statements
by these representatives indicates their intent to provide an
equal educational opportunity, not just equal access for handi-
capped children. For example, a search of the Congressional
record reveals the following statement by Congresswoman Mink:
"The bill seeks to achieve the goal of equal educational opportu-
nity for all handicapped children."81 Congresswoman Mink else-
where noted the regrettable reality that handicapped children
did not yet enjoy equal educational opportunity.8 2 In the same
discussion from which the Rowley majority extracted Senator
Cranston's reference to access, the Senator also stated that the
EHA represented a broadening of the principle of equal educa-
tional opportunity to include handicapped children.83 Precisely
where the Court found Senator Javits' reference to access, the
Senator also stated that handicapped children were entitled to
the same educational opportunity as all other children." This
analysis suggests that the Rowley majority selected isolated
statements, and simply ignored other remarks by the same rep-
resentatives which would have damaged the Court's argument.
A balanced reading of statements by key Congressional sup-
porters of the EHA indicate an intent to provide equal educa-
tional opportunity for handicapped children. Senator Randolph,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Handicapped, noted that
Congress had not met its goal of providing full educational ser-
vices to handicapped children through the Education Amend-
ments of 1974, and that four million children were still entirely
excluded from an adequate education. But the Senator did not
advocate simply providing access to school for these children. He
stated that the EHA promised to handicapped children "the
educational opportunity that has long been considered the right
of every other American child." 6 Senator Stafford" explained
(1975).
80. Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S .... n.13, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3043, n.13
(1982).
81. 121 CONG. REC. 37031 (1975).
82. Id. at 37030 (1975).
83. Id. at 19503 (1975).
84. Id. at 19494 (1975).
85. Id. at 37410 (1975).
86. Senator Stafford was at the time ranking minority member of the Subcommittee
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that the EHA made its first priority those children totally
excluded from schools and made its second priority severely
handicapped children. Although suggestive of an access stan-
dard, the Senator prefaced his entire discussion with the follow-
ing statement: "We can all agree that [the education that handi-
capped children are entitled to receive] should be equivalent at
least to the one those children who are not handicapped
receive. ''7 Equal educational opportunity for handicapped chil-
dren, the Senator believed, was the goal; the EHA was the
means for achieving that end and funding prioritization was a
necessary part of the means. Senator Schweiker 8 addressed the
access problems, but he concluded that "Congress must take a
more active role. . . to guarantee that handicapped children are
provided equal educational opportunity. "89  Congressman
Brademas9° thought it was shameful that 1.75 million handi-
capped children were excluded entirely from an education, but
said it was equally shameful that handicapped children were
denied an equal educational opportunity. 1 Numerous other dec-
larations by supporters demonstrate that Congress intended
through the EHA to provide not just access, but an equal educa-
tional opportunity as well.92
Language in the Congressional committee reports of the
EHA allows a court to derive an educational standard even
higher than equal educational opportunity. The reports proclaim
on the Handicapped.
87. 121 CONG. REc. 19,483 (1975).
88. Senator Schweiker was a member of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Com-
mittee and later, Secretary of Health and Human Services in the Reagan Administration.
89. 121 CONG. REc. 19,504 (1975).
90. Congressman Brademas was the author and cosponsor of the EHA in the House
of Representatives.
91. 121 CONG. REC. 23,704 (1975).
92. Senator Beall, a member of the Senate Labor and Welfare Committee, hoped
the EHA would "insure . . . equal educational opportunities for all handicapped" chil-
dren. 121 CONG. REc. 19,506 (1975). Senator Williams, Chairman of the Senate Labor
and Public Welfare Committee, claimed the EHA fulfilled "the promise of the Constitu-
tion that there shall be equality of education for all people, and that handicapped chil-
dren no longer will be left out." 121 CONG. REc. 37,413 (1975). Senator Humphrey saw
the EHA as one in a series of steps by Congress to correct what had been "the violation
of [handicapped] children's rights to an equal and free education." 121 CONG. REc.
19,504 (1975). Congressman Quie saw the EHA as "one of the most meaningful and ben-
eficial steps ever taken by Congress . . .toward bringing equal educational rights for
[handicapped children]." 121 CONG. REc. 23,706 (1975). Congressman Grassley lamented
the fact that "handicapped children have always been slighted on equal educational
opportunity." 121 CONG. Rac. 25,540 (1975).
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numerous times that the EHA is a means to provide "full educa-
tional opportunities"93 for all handicapped children. The Senate
report uses "full educational services" and "comprehensive ser-
vices ' 94 synonymously with the free appropriate public educa-
tion the EHA is to supply. The House report stresses in three
places the goal of maximizing each handicapped child's poten-
tial95 and twice emphasizes maximizing the benefits" to each
handicapped child. The equal educational opportunity standard
developed by the two lower federal courts in Rowley reasonably
compromised between these extreme references and providing
no education at all. The Supreme Court, by contrast, ignored
references to equal educational opportunity and selected Con-
gressional statements which referred to access. A study of the
entire legislative history, however, suggests that Congress con-
templated substantially more than getting handicapped children
to school.
The third source Justice Rehnquist relied on were tables in
the Congressional reports97 and statements by representatives98
depicting the problem as it stood in 1975. These tables and
statements show the number of handicapped children who were
receiving or not receiving an education in 1975. Justice Rehn-
quist concluded that these tables and statements were evidence
that the EHA imposed "no clear obligation upon recipient states
beyond the requirement that handicapped children receive some
form of specialized education." 99
Searching for the substantive content of the EHA in these
tables has questionable validity. Typical of Congressional
reports, the Senate report begins by describing the problem
before Congress. The cited tables are in the Senate report sec-
tion titled "Need for Legislation."100 In this very section, after
93. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 8, 15, 18, 31, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1427, 1432, 1439, 1441-42, 1454-55; H.R. RE. No. 332,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 11, 50 (1975).
94. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1441-42.
95. S. RaP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1455-56.
96. H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. 7, 13, 19 (1975).
97. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1432; H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1975).
98. Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S .... n.13, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3043 n.13
(1982).
99. 458 U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 3045.
100. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
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describing the problem in 1975, the Senate committee concludes,
"Congress must take a more active role . . . to guarantee that
handicapped children are provided equal educational opportu-
nity." 10 1 The following sections of the Senate report, according
to the common structure of Congressional reports, describe in
detail how the EHA provisions will remedy the problem. 12 Jus-
tice Rehnquist's reliance on language describing the problem, in
an effort to elucidate Congress's intent with regard to the educa-
tional standard that the EHA required, was inappropriate. Since
Congress obviously did not intend to perpetuate the problem,
the only rational source for Congress' intent was the remedial
language in the reports.
Remedial language in the reports as well as regulations
implementing this language demonstrate that Congress intended
an exhaustive educational program for handicapped children.
Congress expected physical education services, specially
designed where necessary, as an integral part of every handi-
capped child's education.103 Congress urged art programs for
handicapped children. 104 Congress demanded that school dis-
tricts develop extracurricular activities which accorded handi-
capped children an opportunity to participate "to the same
extent as nonhandicapped children.1 06 Congress required each
school district to take steps to provide as broad a range of edu-
cational programs and services to handicapped children as were
available to nonhandicapped children in the district. 0 6 Certainly
AD. NEWS 1425, 1431-33. See also H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975).
101. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1432.
102. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-38, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1425, 1433-62.
103. H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1975); S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 12 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1436.
104. H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1975); S. REP. No. 168, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425,
1436-37.
105. H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975). 34 C.F.R. § 300.306 (1982)
requires each school district to take steps to "provide non-academic and extracurricular
services and activities in such manner as is necessary to afford handicapped children an
equal opportunity for participation in those services and activities."
106. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. 12, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1436. 34 C.F.R. § 300.305 (1982) requires each school district to take
steps to "insure that its handicapped children have available to them the variety of edu-
cational programs and services available to non-handicapped children in the area served
by the agency, including art, music, industrial arts, consumer and homemaking educa-
tion, and vocational education."
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the remedial language of the EHA does not indicate a Congres-
sional intent to provide mere access to schools for handicapped
children. Rather, Congress envisioned a broad, highly ambitious
program that would provide each handicapped child with an
educational opportunity equal to that provided nonhandicapped
children.
Since the Court's rejection of the equal educational oppor-
tunity standard is not justified by reference to the three sources
to which the Rowley majority points, the Court's decision is per-
haps best explained by unarticulated reasons. A window on
these concerns may have been provided in Rodriguez, which like
Rowley, raised large and difficult issues. Although the Court in
Rodriguez was careful to point out that this was not the basis of
its holding,10 7 the Court noted that affirmance "would occasion
. . . an unprecedented upheaval in public education."' 08 Recog-
nizing the equal educational opportunity standard in Rowley,
like recognizing the equal per pupil expenditure requirement in
Rodriguez, the Court probably realized, would have greatly
increased the financial burden on States and school districts,
which the Court may have felt they were unable to shoulder.
Furthermore, the Court in Rowley may have thought, as it
stated in Rodriguez, that affirmance would have meant infringe-
ment by Congress and the courts on decision making in the
areas of educational policy and local fiscal policy which were
matters best left to the States and school districts. 0 9 If these
were the actual, unarticulated reasons for rejection of the equal
educational opportunity standard, the Court baldly engaged in
public policy making. These functions are better left to the legis-
lative judgment of Congress.
Conforming to its finding that Congress intended only
access to public schools for handicapped children, the Rowley
Court held that the educational standard required is that which
enables a child to "benefit" educationally.1 0 This "benefit"
standard is met in the case of a mainstreamed handicapped
child, the Court suggested, if that child makes "academic pro-
gress." ' The Court held that a state provides a free appropriate
107. 411 U.S. at 56.
108. Id. at 58.
109. Id. at 49-53, 56, 58.
110. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
111. The Court stated that it did not mean to hold that every handicapped child
advancing grade-to-grade in a regular public school system is automatically receiving a
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public education if it supplies the four elements of the EHA
statutory definition: (1) special education and related services
provided at public expense, (2) which meet state educational
agency standards, (3) which approximate the grade level in regu-
lar schools, and (4) comport with the child's IEP.11 2 In addition,
the Court stated that a mainstreamed handicapped child's IEP
should be formulated "to enable the child to achieve passing
marks and advance from grade to grade,""1 3 and that the "grad-
ing. . . system. . . constitutes an important factor in determin-
ing educational benefit. 11 4 The Court's language strongly sug-
gests that a school district may show fulfillment of a
mainstreamed child's IEP, and, consequently, compliance with
the educational benefit standard, by presenting evidence of pass-
ing marks and advancement from grade to grade by the main-
streamed child.
If the Court means that "academic progress" is now suffi-
cient to show that an IEP has been properly fulfilled, the educa-
tional benefit standard will render the IEP meaningless. Clearly,
this is not consistent with legislative objectives in enacting the
EHA. Substantial evidence suggests that Congress intended the
criterion of a successful IEP to be whether it provided an educa-
tional opportunity for a handicapped child equal to that pro-
vided a nonhandicapped child.1 1 5 Passing marks, concededly, are
one factor in this determination, but not the sole factor. Con-
gress intended an ongoing IEP process that included regular
evaluation of the IEP's success by the parent, the child's
teacher, and the child himself where appropriate.11 6 If the IEP
had not succeeded, Congress intended that these same individu-
als revise the IEP to include a new written plan of goals and
resources that would succeed. If a school district's showing of
passing marks replaces the IEP process, the EHA will be criti-
cally impaired.
The Court's educational benefit standard is toothless. The
standard requires a minimal effort by school districts with
free appropriate public education. In Amy's case, however, the Court found her academic
progress "dispositive." Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S .... n.25, 102 S. Ct.
3034, 3049, n.25, (1982).
112. See supra note 10.
113. 458 U.S .... 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3049 (1982).
114. 458 U.S .... 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3049 (1982).
115. See supra notes 59-60, 72-73, 81-92 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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regard to handicapped children. For example, even with a tutor,
hearing aid, and speech therapist, Amy Rowley received only
60% of the information a nonhandicapped child received in
class. 117 Yet under the Court's standard, the district could con-
ceivably still comply with the EHA if it took away these aids
and gave Amy a teacher with a loud voice.' The district could
show compliance with the educational benefit standard since the
loud-speaking teacher would represent personalized instruction
and support services that benefited Amy educationally. The
Rowley Court's educational benefit standard strays far from
Congress's intended equal educational opportunity standard and
significantly undercuts the meaning of a free appropriate public
education.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW AFTER Rowley
In whatever manner the educational benefit standard
undermines a child's IEP, Rowley assures that courts will not be
involved in either revising the standard or in resolving whether a
particular handicapped child is being given a free appropriate
public education. Despite the EHA provisions that allow a par-
ent dissatisfied with a state educational agency decision to bring
a de novo action in state or federal court, 19 Rowley held that a
court may make only two inquiries: (1) whether the state has
complied with EHA procedures, and (2) whether the child's IEP
is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive an educa-
tional benefit.1 20 Courts may no longer probe into the substan-
tive educational requirements of the EHA,121 or into methodolo-
gies employed in a child's IEP. 21 These, the Court said, are
solely state educational decisions.' 3
Essentially delineating a restricted scope of review, this
interpretation of a de novo court's authority is an unwarranted
circumscription of EHA provisions. EHA § 1415(e)(2) plainly
allows a parent dissatisfied with the state educational agency
117. See 483 F. Supp. at 532.
118. The Rowley dissent suggested this possible result under the majority's educa-
tional benefit standard. Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S .... 102 S. Ct. 3034,
3055 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
119. See supra note 21.
120. 458 U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 3051.
121. Id. at _, 102 S. Ct. at 3051.
122. Id. at _, 102 S. Ct. at 3052.
123. Id. at _, 102 S. Ct. at 3052.
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decision to bring a de novo action in state or federal court on the
original complaint brought at the local hearing. Such complaint
may contain "any matter relating to the identification, evalua-
tion, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a
free appropriate public education to such child.' 24 The legisla-
tive history also supports a Congressional intent to provide
broad de novo court review.12 After Rowley, however, a court
answering its two narrow inquiries in the negative may only
return the case to the state educational agency for adjustment in
the child's IEP, either to make sure EHA procedures are fol-
lowed or to make sure the child gets some sort of educational
benefit from his or her IEP. Rowley severely undercuts Con-
gress's judicial review provisions in the EHA.
The Court justified this narrowed scope of judicial inquiry
and the virtual abdication of placement of decisions in favor of
the state on the basis of two safeguards: (1) the participation
given to concerned parties under the EHA in formation of the
child's IEP;2 6 and (2) the continued ardor of parents seeking
benefits for their child. 2 7 Parental ardor, however, is futile with-
out procedural safeguards by which to appeal the school dis-
trict's placement decision. Agency decisions in Washington state
have created an educational standard and administrative pre-
sumptions which severely limit a parent's administrative appeal
opportunity. Contrary to the Rowley majority assertion, these
decisions illustrate the need for broad de novo review.
IV. WASHINGTON STATE EHA DECISIONS
The Washington State assault on the EHA procedural safe-
guards occurred in four decisions of the state review officer
(S.R.O.) for the Superintendent of Public Instruction. The major
blows against the procedural safeguards were struck by the
S.R.O.'s use of a "suitable" education standard and development
of three presumptions: (1) the Marty S. presumption, (2) the
dominant view presumption, and (3) the Vickie M. presumption.
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (E) (1976).
125. Senator Williams, Chairman of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Commit-
tee, emphasized that "a complaint may involve matters such as questions respecting a
child's individualized education program, .. .whether special education and related ser-
vices are being provided without charge . .. or any other question within the scope of
the definition of free appropriate public education." 121 CONG. Rac. 37,415 (1975).
126. 458 U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 3052.
127. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 3052.
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The S.R.O. based his decisions on state regulations' that
implement RCW 28.13,129 the Washington state counterpart to
the federal EHA. 130 These decisions are precedential authority
for local hearing officers31 and, therefore, greatly influence the
outcome of local EHA hearings in Washington State.
The leading EHA administrative decision in Washington
State is In Re Marty S.132 Marty was a deaf child133 in the Spo-
kane School District. Uncontested facts at the local hearing and
S.R.O. level established that Marty was handicapped,"' was
entitled to a free appropriate public education, 35 and needed a
specifically designed program to remedy his communication
problems. 136 Marty's parents requested that his IEP include two
additional hours per day of linguistic tutoring. 13 7 The school dis-
trict maintained that its program 8 without the tutoring was
128. WASH. ADMIN. CODE chs. 392-171 through 392-173 (1980) attempt to implement
WASH. REV. CODE ch. 28A.13 (1981) in accordance with the federal EHA. The state regu-
lations are, with a few exceptions, a mirror image of the federal regulations.
129. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.13.005 (1981) states that its purpose is to ensure that
all handicapped children, as defined in WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.12.010 (1981), shall have
the opportunity for an appropriate education at public expense as guaranteed to them by
the Constitution of this state. The Washington State Constitution article IX § 1, pro-
vides that "[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the edu-
cation of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on
account of race, color, caste, or sex."
130. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 28A.13 (1981) besides mimicking the federal EHA provi-
sions, established a division of special education for handicapped children in the Office
of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and granted the Superintendent of Public
Instruction the power to withhold funds from a school district for not providing handi-
capped children an opportunity for an appropriate education.
131. See, e.g., In re Jean Marie and Michelle Lyn H., Special Educ. Cause No. 79-
2A and 79-2B, at 16 (Superintendent of Pub. Instruc., Wash., Aug., 1979); In re Gregory
K., Special Educ. Cause No. 812, at 4-5 (Superintendent of Pub. Instruc., Wash., Sept.,
1981).
132. In re Marty S., Special Educ. Cause No. 78-1 (Superintendent of Pub. Instruc.,
Wash., Oct., 1978).
133. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-171-436 (1980) for the definition and eligibility
criteria for deaf children.
134. A handicapped child is one having a disability set forth in WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 392-171-381 through -451 (1980).
135. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-171-310 (1980) defines a free appropriate public edu-
cation as special education and related services provided at public expense, under local
school district supervision, without charge, which meet the standards of the state educa-
tional agency, and are provided in conformity with an individualized education program.
136. In re Marty S., Special Educ. Cause No. 78-1, at 17 (Superintendent of Pub.
Instruc., Wash., Oct., 1978).
137. Id. at 18.
138. The district's IEP for Marty included (1) placement in a self-contained class-
room for part of the school day where both group and individualized attention is given,
(2) placement in a regular classroom for part of the school day where a signer is provided
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"best" designed to assist Marty. The S.R.O. held the following:
The proper standard for review is not "best", but "appropri-
ate" education as that term has been previously defined as
meeting the unique needs of the handicapped child. In com-
mon usage the term appears synonymous with "suitable" or
specifically designed. As a term of art, it responds more to the
question of whether the shoe "fits" rather than whether it is
the "best" shoe.'30
Since Marty S., the educational standard expressing a free
appropriate education under the EHA in Washington is not the
best program for the child but merely a suitable one.
While the "suitable education" standard probably conforms
to Rowley's educational benefit standard, it undermines the
advocacy role Congress intended for parents under the EHA.140
The S.R.O. provided no criteria for determining whether a
child's educational program is suitable. Local hearing officers,
therefore, have considerable discretion to make this determina-
tion. This procedure would be unobjectionable if the suitable
education standard afforded parents the same opportunity to
object to an educational program as that provided by an equal
educational opportunity standard, but it does not. The two stan-
dards do not have the same reference point. An equal educa-
tional opportunity standard compares a handicapped and non-
handicapped similarly circumstanced. A parent can understand
and demonstrate the educational opportunity afforded a non-
handicapped child and contrast it with that given their handi-
capped child. A "suitable education", by contrast, is one that fits
the particular handicapped child and refers only to that particu-
lar child. Under this standard, parents can at most argue that a
program does not fit their child. Disputes under this standard
are reduced to opposing opinions about a child's capabilities or
potential. Since the district can rightly claim greater expertise in
such evaluations, the district will prevail in such disputes before
hearing officers under the suitable education standard. The suit-
able education standard, therefore, weakens the advocacy role
Congress intended for parents under the EHA.
when needed, and (3) personal instruction with a communications disorder specialist,
scheduled for 20 hours per year. Id.
139. In re Marty S., Special Educ. Cause No. 78-1, at 22 (Superintendent of Pub.
Instruc., Wash., Oct., 1978).
140. See H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1975); S. REP. No. 168, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 47, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1470-71.
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Also in this decision, the S.R.O. formulated the Marty S.
presumption. A school district may gain the presumption that
the handicapped child's IEP meets state and federal EHA
requirements for a free appropriate public education by showing
the following: (1) the district made an IEP conforming to state
and federal EHA regulations, (2) the district's experts who
assessed the child and made the IEP were qualified, and (3) the
district's experts and the COH experts"" were nearly unanimous
in the assessment and the making of the IEP. When the district
acquires the presumption, the burden of proof shifts to the par-
ents to show that the IEP does not provide the child with a free
appropriate public education.1 42
The Marty S. presumption is not supported by federal or
state authority in statute, case law, or regulations. The federal
EHA requires that the hearing officer and the S.R.O. make an
"impartial review" of the case and that the S.R.O. make an
"independent decision. '148 Washington State regulations require
the hearing officer and S.R.O. to base their decisions on a pre-
ponderance of the evidence,1 44 but make no mention of pre-
sumptions. A Washington Superior Court discussing the Marty
S. presumption stated that no presumption of appropriateness
arises in hearings, but this was dictum.1 4' Despite the lack of
authority, the Marty S. presumption has dominated subsequent
Washington EHA administrative review cases; only in rare
instances have parents overcome the presumption.1 46
141. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-171-351(1) (1980) mandates an assessment team
composed of the child's teacher and an individual qualified to conduct diagnostic exami-
nations such as a school psychologist. This team is sometimes designated as the Commit-
tee on the Handicapped or COH.
142. In re Marty S., Special Educ. Cause No. 78-1, at 26 (Superintendent of Pub.
Instruc., Wash., Oct., 1978).
143. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1976); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1976).
144. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-171-566(6)(e) (1981); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-171-
556(1)(a) (1981).
145. Hunter v. Lake Washington School Dist. #414, Wash. Super. Ct. No. 79-2-
03412-6 (Nov. 20, 1980). The court noted that it was nonsensical to require a party to
overcome the presumption and offer additional evidence to create a preponderance of
the evidence at the administrative level and require only preponderance of the evidence
in court; this the court said would simply encourage parties challenging an IEP to bypass
administrative review and seek judicial review immediately. Id. at 15-17.
146. Two examples of where parents successfully overcame the Marty S. presump-
tion are In re Vickie M., Special Educ. Cause No. 80-4 (Superintendent of Pub. Instruc.,
Wash., Nov., 1980), where the parents showed that the personnel who drew up the IEP
were not qualified; and In re Eric P., Special Educ. Cause No. 79-4 (Superintendent of
Pub. Instruc., Wash., June, 1979), where the parents showed that the school district
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The formidable burden of the Marty S. presumption upon a
parent asserting their child's right to a free appropriate public
education is unjustifiable. The district employs a battery of
experts to make the child's IEP. These experts have the same
employer and work together daily. Arguably, district experts are
unlikely to disagree on the child's IEP or the educational meth-
odologies used. And even if these experts do not entirely agree,
they are likely to rally behind the district upon challenge to the
district's IEP by parents and their experts. Since the district
gains the Marty S. presumption by showing prima facie compli-
ance with state and federal EHA regulations more familiar to
the district than to the parents, and by near unanimity of
experts unlikely to disagree in the first place, parents start the
administrative review process at a great disadvantage. The
Marty S. presumption, moreover, clearly violates Congress's
intent with regard to the IEP process by giving disproportionate
weight to the expert's opinion. Congress intended an IEP pro-
cess in which the parent, the child's teacher, the expert, and
even the handicapped child himself would participate in evalua-
tion and revision of the IEP.14 7 Congress nowhere stated that
the opinion of the parent, teacher, and child were to be devalued
relative to the expert's opinion .when the IEP was administra-
tively reviewed, although this is the effect of the Marty S.
presumption.
The only weapon that parents of Washington's handicapped
children have to challenge a proposed IEP is expert testimony.
Marty S., In re Jean Marie and Michelle Lyn H.,"' and In re
John Mc.,"4 9 held that these experts must meet a "specific
knowledge" requirement in addition to showing general compe-
tence. Marty's expert testified that Marty unquestionably would
benefit from the tutoring that his parents requested in his
IEP." °0 The school district did not contest this."5' Nonetheless,
the S.R.O. found that the testimony of Marty's expert was of
"limited value" because, while Marty's expert had substantial
experts were not in near unanimity.
147. See supra notes 11, 12.
148. Special Educ. Cause No. 79-2A and 79-2B (Superintendent of Pub. Instruc.,
Wash., Aug., 1979).
149. Special Educ. Cause No. 79-7 (Superintendent of Puc. Instruc., Wash., Mar.,
1980).
150. In re Marty S., Special Educ. Cause No. 78-1, at 19 (Superintendent of Pub.
Instruc., Wash., Oct., 1978).
151. Id. at 21.
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knowledge of the general educational needs of deaf children, he
had only limited knowledge about Marty S. 152 The S.R.O.
strongly implied that testimony by a parent's expert, even if
nationally renowned for educating a class of handicapped chil-
dren, is insufficient. The parent's expert must have specific
knowledge about the particular child before his testimony can
overcome the opposing opinion of the district's experts.
The "specific knowledge" requirement places another bar-
rier, generally an economic one, in front of parents. Not only
must the parent find a respected expert, but the expert must be
employed for a sufficient length of time to familiarize himself
thoroughly with the particular handicapped child. Only then will
his testimony be credible. Few parents of handicapped children
can afford such an expense, nor arguably should they have to.
There can be little reason, other than administrative efficiency,
to deny parents the right to have their evidence considered.
Whereas Congress meant the hearing procedure to strengthen
the substantive rights created by the EHA, the result of these
presumptions is a weakening of those rights.
The dominant view presumption was formulated in Jean
Marie, where the S.R.O. held that, in the battle of experts, the
standard for review purposes is the dominant view of the profes-
sion.158 Although the girls' parents insisted that only the oral-
aural teaching method 1" was appropriate for Jean Marie and
Michelle Lyn, the total communication method 55 prescribed by
the district was considered appropriate for any deaf child, in the
dominant view of the profession. Thus Jean Marie and Michelle
Lyn's IEP's, calling for the total communication method, were
appropriate.' 56
152. Id. at 22.
153. In re Jean Marie and Michelle Lyn H., Special Educ. Cause No. 79-2A and 79-
2B, at 15 (Superintendent of Pub. Instruc., Wash., Aug., 1979).
154. The oral-aural instructional technique emphasizes the development of the
residual hearing capacities of the deaf child, relies on the child's listening and visual
skills, and encourages a child to develop a speaking ability with signing as a supplement.
In re Erik K., Special Educ. Cause No. 78-5, at 3-4 (Superintendent of Pub. Instruc.,
Wash., Jan., 1979).
155. The total communication instruction methodology for deaf children emphasizes
signing, relies on the child's visual and manual abilities, and is a more limited form of
communication than the oral-aural instructional technique. In re Erik K., Special Educ.
Cause No. 78-5, at 3-4 (Superintendent of Pub. Instruc., Wash., Jan., 1979).
156. In re Jean Marie and Michelle Lyn H., Special Educ. Cause No. 79-2A and 79-
2B, at 15 (Superintendent of Pub. Instruc. Wash., Aug., 1979). The S.R.O. did not rule,
as he was requested to by the parents, whether the oral-aural educational methodology
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The dominant view presumption is as unsupportable as the
Marty S. presumption. No authority exists for it in the federal
or state EHA statutes or regulations.15 7
A more significant defect is that whether a method or the-
ory is a minority or dominant view has no relation to its validity
with regard to a particular handicapped child. The dominant
medical treatment and education methods, for example, were
ineffective with John Mc.; the minority medical treatment and
education methods successfully educated John. 5 ' A minority
professional view or educational method which has successfully
educated the particular handicapped child, at the very least,
deserves an airing by the parent as to its continuing validity and
should not be dismissed outright by a presumption. A more fun-
damental criticism of the dominant view presumption is that it
is conceptually flawed. The S.R.O. admitted in John Mc. that a
minority view "like all new ideas or theories. . . must begin as a
minority opinion .. .before it can become a dominant opinion
or standard . . . practice accepted within the profession."' 5' The
logical extension of the S.R.O.'s statement is that a minority
view rejected today may become the dominant view tomorrow;
this lessens considerably the significance of a view's dominance.
Foreclosing presentation of evidence by experts on the basis of
the dominant view presumption is defensible only on the ground
of administrative efficiency. Administrative efficiency, however,
must not eclipse Congress's primary goal: serving the unique
needs of the handicapped child."" This is best achieved by a full
airing of all views or methodologies relevant to educating the
child.
The third doctrine marshalled against parents in Washing-
ton State is the Vickie M. presumption. Vickie's parents had
challenged her IEP, alleging that she needed additional tutoring
was appropriate in general for deaf children and specifically appropriate for Jean Marie
and Michelle Lyn.
157. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-171-546(3) (1980) permits hearing officers to take
notice of a legislatively enacted state or federal rule embodied in reported court cases or
statutes, adjudicative facts not in reasonable dispute because generally known within the
school district or based on unquestionably accurate sources, and scientific facts within
the specialized knowledge of the hearing officer. However, the regulations do not mention
the authority in hearing officers to notice disputed educational methodologies, and medi-
cal and psychological views. Id.
158. In re John Mc., Special Educ. Cause No. 79-7 at 5-6 (Superintendent of Pub.
Instruc., Wash., Mar., 1980).
159. Id. at 9.
160. See supra note 10. See H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Seass. 8 (1975).
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to obtain a free appropriate public education. 161 In the course of
deciding for Vickie's parents, the S.R.O. recited the four statu-
tory indicators of a free appropriate public education under the
state EHA: planned teaching (1) by certified personnel, (2)
directed to the student's unique needs, (3) designed to facilitate
progress towards specific written objectives, and which (4)
occurs repeatedly during regular sessions.""' The S.R.O. then
held that "the existence of academic progress serves to establish
that the third criterion of an appropriate program has been
met.' 53 The third Washington statutory criterion for a free
appropriate public education expresses the federal EHA require-
ment of an IEP for each handicapped child. Thus, a showing of
"academic progress" creates a presumption of a successful IEP;
"academic progress" with a showing of indicators 1, 2, and 4 cre-
ates a presumption that a free appropriate public education has
been provided to the handicapped child.
The S.R.O. has asserted, just like the Rowley Court, that
academic progress indicates a successful IEP. The Vickie M.
presumption is objectionable for the same reasons that Rowley's
passing marks language is objectionable. Although "academic
progress" is one relevant factor in evaluating the success of a
mainstreamed child's IEP, no evidence supports the view that it
is the sole criterion. Rather, substantial evidence in the legisla-
tive history indicates that Congress intended the measure of a
successful IEP to be its ability to provide a handicapped child
with an educational opportunity equal to that provided a non-
handicapped child.
Congress carefully designed the procedural safeguards in
EHA to enable parents to assert their child's right to a free
appropriate public education.1 Clearly, the aggregate effect of
the suitable education standard, the Marty S. presumption, the
specific knowledge requirement, the dominant view presump-
tion, and the Vickie M. presumption is, however, to discourage
161. In re Vickie M., Special Educ. Cause No. 80-4, at 26-27 (Superintendent of
Pub. Instruc. Wash., Nov., 1980).
162. Id. at 17. These four indicators of a free appropriate public education were
derived from WASH. RPv. CODE § 28A.13.010 (1981) and WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-171-
317 (1980).
163. In re Vickie M., Special Educ. Cause No. 80-4, at 18 (Superintendent of Pub.
Instruc. Wash., Nov., 1980). Moreover, if the parent establishes that their child's IEP is
inappropriate, the district may raise the "defense" of academic progress by showing that
the handicapped child's academic progress "is not significantly substandard." Id.
164. H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. 15 (1975).
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and prevent parents in many cases from asserting their child's
right. A parent in the State of Washington must hire experts for
a time sufficiently long for the expert to gain familiarity with the
child. The expert must be careful to espouse a dominant view or
methodology. A parent is hard pressed to show that their child's
education is not "suitable," since the district's evaluation of the
child's capabilities is likely to be more persuasive than the par-
ents'. Assuming a parent overcomes the Marty S. presumption,
demonstrating that the IEP is inappropriate, the district may
retort with a showing of "academic progress" that presumes a
successful IEP. Prior to Rowley, a parent had further recourse.
Rowley failed to reverse these state attacks on the EHA.
The Court's "educational benefit" standard requires no more
substantive content to a handicapped child's education than a
"suitable education" standard. The Court's suggestion that pass-
ing marks signify a mainstreamed child's successful IEP encour-
ages states to adopt an administrative presumption that
enshrines the suggestion and avoids the IEP process mandated
by Congress. Before Rowley a parent overcome by the state's
educational standard, the state's "academic progress" showing,
or the state's marshaling of administrative presumptions could
count on de novo court review. Rowley, however, eliminated this
protection. Rowley's purported "safeguards" of parental partici-
pation in the IEP process and parental ardor simply mock the
elaborate scheme established by Congress in the EHA.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1975, Congress recognized that more than half of the
nation's handicapped children were not receiving an adequate
education. Congress sought to remedy the problem by passing
the EHA, which was to provide every handicapped child with a
free appropriate public education. The Supreme Court's decision
in Rowley, however, severely cripples the effectiveness of the
EHA by ratifying state attacks on the EHA which have occurred
since its enactment. Congress must intervene to salvage the
EHA. Congress must make clear that states are required to pro-
vide to handicapped children an educational opportunity equal
to that provided nonhandicapped children or risk losing their
EHA funding. Furthermore, Congress should declare that it will
not tolerate any erosion in the IEP process, and that the stan-
dard against which the success of an IEP is to be measured is
the ability of the IEP to provide an educational opportunity
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equal to that provided nonhandicapped children. Only by clari-
fying its goals in the EHA can Congress ensure equal educa-
tional opportunity for handicapped children.
Karl Boettner
